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This article critically examines the New South Wales State Government's latest policy response to the 
problem of alcohol-related violence and anxiety about 'one punch' killings: the recently enacted Crimes 
and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW). Based on an analysis of 
both the circumstances out of which it emerged, and the terms in which the new offences of assault 
causing death and assault causing death while intoxicated have been defined, I argue that the Act 
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prevention in relation to alcohol-fuelled violence. 
Keywords 
implications, nsw, criminal, law, factor, aggravating, fuelled, punch, alcohol, one, minimums, mandatory, 
laws 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
J. Quilter, 'One-punch laws, mandatory minimums and 'alcohol-fuelled' as an aggravating factor: 
implications for NSW criminal law' (2014) 3 (1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 81-106. 













This	 article	 critically	 examines	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 State	 Government’s	 latest	 policy	
response	 to	 the	problem	of	alcohol‐related	violence	and	anxiety	about	 ‘one	punch’	killings:	
the	recently	enacted	Crimes	and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	
2014	(NSW).	Based	on	an	analysis	of	both	the	circumstances	out	of	which	it	emerged,	and	the	
terms	 in	which	 the	 new	offences	 of	 assault	 causing	 death	 and	 assault	 causing	 death	while	











On	 30	 January	 2014	 the	New	 South	Wales	 (NSW)	Parliament	 added	 two	 new	 offences	 to	 the	
Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW):	assault	causing	death,	and	an	aggravated	version	of	that	offence	where	
the	offender	 is	 intoxicated	 at	 the	 time	of	 committing	 the	offence.	 For	only	 the	 second	 time	 in	
recent	history,	the	NSW	Parliament	included	a	mandatory	minimum	sentence	(in	relation	to	the	
aggravated	 offence).2	 This	 article	 critically	 analyses	 both	 the	 content	 of	 the	Crimes	and	Other	
Legislation	Amendment	 (Assault	and	 Intoxication)	Act	2014	 (NSW)	 and	 the	 circumstance	of	 its	
emergence	 and	 enactment.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 Act	 represents	 another	 example	 of	 criminal	 law	
‘reform’	that	is	devoid	of	principle,	produces	a	lack	of	coherence	in	the	criminal	law	and,	in	its	





1. The	 speed	 with	 which	 the	 offence	 was	 announced	 and	 passed,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	







2. The	 adoption	 of	 an	 ‘assault	 causing	 death’	 offence	 represents	 an	 example	 of	 ‘policy	
transfer’	 from	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 in	 Australia	 to	 the	 common	 law	 States	 without	
proper	‘translation’;		
3. The	 failure	 to	 give	 principled	 consideration	 to	 how	 the	 new	 offences	 relate	 to	 the	















 A	new	one‐punch	 law	with	 an	 aggravated	 version	 having	 a	 25	 year	maximum	 and	 an	
eight	 year	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentence	 where	 the	 offender	 is	 intoxicated	 by	 drugs	
and/or	alcohol;	
 New	mandatory	minimum	sentences	 for	certain	violent	offences	where	 the	offender	 is	
intoxicated	by	drugs	and/or	alcohol;3	













Just	 over	 a	week	 later,	 on	 30	 January	 2014,	without	 any	 known	public	 consultation	 from	 the	
NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	(NSWLRC)	or	other	expert	groups,	Premier	O’Farrell	read	for	a	
second	time	the	Crimes	and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Bill	2014	
and	 the	 Liquor	 Amendment	 Bill	 2014.4	 With	 alarming	 speed,	 the	 Bills	 were	 passed	 by	 both	
houses	without	substantial	amendment	and	on	the	same	day	they	were	introduced.	The	Crimes	
and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	2014	(‘the	Act’)	received	assent	
and	commenced	operation	 the	next	day,	31	 January	2014.	Premier	O’Farrell	 thereby	achieved	




The	 two	 Acts	 introduce	 into	 law	 all	 elements	 of	 the	 16‐point	 Plan	 announced	 on	 21	 January	







significantly	 increases	 the	penalties	 for	 certain	public	order	offences	 in	 the	Summary	Offences	
Act	1988	(NSW)	(notably	raising	the	maximum	penalty	for	the	continuation	of	intoxication	and	
disorderly	 behaviour	 following	 a	move	 on	 direction	 in	 s	 9	 from	6	 penalty	 units	 ($660)	 to	 15	
penalty	units	($1650)	and	the	penalty	notice	offences	for	offensive	conduct	(from	$200	to	$500),	
offensive	 language	 (from	 $200	 to	 $500)	 and	 s	 9	 (from	 $200	 to	 $1,100)).	 While	 these	 last	
amendments	will	not	be	addressed	further	in	this	paper,	they	are	of	great	significance	given	the	





The	Act	 introduces	 the	basic	offence	of	 ‘Assault	 causing	death’	 in	 s	25A(1)	and	an	aggravated	
version	of	that	offence	in	s	25A(2)	into	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW)	Pt	3,	Div	1	 ‘Homicide’.	This	
amendment	constitutes	the	 first	substantive	change	 to	 the	offence	structure	of	homicide	since	













































or	 other	 substance	 in	 the	 accused’s	 breath,	 blood	 or	 urine	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
alleged	 offence	 as	 determined	 by	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	 with	
Division	 4	 of	 Part	 10	 of	 the	Law	Enforcement	 (Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	
2002,	and	
	
(b)	 the	 accused	 is	 conclusively	 presumed	 to	 be	 intoxicated	 by	 alcohol	 if	 the	
prosecution	 proves	 in	 accordance	 with	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	
with	 that	 Division	 that	 there	 was	 present	 in	 the	 accused’s	 breath	 or	 blood	 a	










legislation	 was	 drafted,	 passed	 and	 commenced	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 intense	 media	 and	
public	campaign	that	was	triggered	by	the	sentencing	in	November	2013	of	Kieran	Loveridge	for	
the	manslaughter	of	Thomas	Kelly,	a	campaign	that	dramatically	intensified	over	the	summer	of	
December/January	 2014.	 It	 was	 within	 this	 context	 that	 a	 ‘penal	 populist’	 (Bottoms	 1995;	
Garland	2001;	Lacey	2008;	Roberts	et	al.	2003;	Pratt	2007;	Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013),	 ‘law	and	
order’	response	(Hogg	and	Brown	1998)	was	offered	by	the	NSW	Government	in	an	attempt	to	





months	 for	 the	 combined	 manslaughter	 of	 Thomas	 Kelly	 and	 four	 other	 unrelated	 assaults,	
being	6	years	 for	manslaughter	 (4	years	non‐parole	period)	 and	1	year	and	2	months	 for	 the	
assaults	(R	v	Loveridge	[2013]	NSWSC	1638	at	[14]‐[18]).	Over	a	year	earlier,	in	July	2012,	in	an	
unprovoked	 attack,	 Mr	 Kelly	 had	 died	 from	 a	 single	 punch	 by	 Mr	 Loveridge,	 when	 he	 was	
walking	 on	 Victoria	 Street,	 Kings	 Cross.	 Mr	 Kelly	 fell	 to	 the	 ground,	 hitting	 his	 head	 on	 the	
pavement	suffering	massive	head	injuries	and	never	regaining	consciousness.	The	tragic	death	
of	Mr	Kelly	triggered	an	immediate	and,	until	the	sentencing	of	Loveridge	in	November	2013,	a	
progressive	populist	 campaign	around	 the	 issue	of	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence	 to	which	 the	NSW	
Government	 responded	with	 an	uncharacteristic	multi‐faceted	 and	nuanced	 response	 (Quilter	






















Soon	 after	 the	 sentence	 was	 handed	 down,	 the	 Kelly	 family	 started	 a	 petition	 to	 the	 NSW	
Premier6	 calling	 for	minimum	 sentencing	 laws	 in	 cases	 of	manslaughter.	 Broader	 support	 for	




On	 14	 November	 2013,	 the	 NSW	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	 (DPP),	 Lloyd	 Babb	 SC,	
announced	an	appeal	of	Mr	Loveridge’s	sentence	for	manifest	inadequacy.	He	also	indicated	that	




new	 one‐punch	 law	 together	 with	 the	 DPP’s	 announcement	 of	 an	 appeal	 of	 Mr	 Loveridge’s	









In	many	 critiques	 of	 penal	 populism,	 the	 allegation	 is	 often	made	 that	 the	media	 distorts	 the	






sentencing,	 the	 campaigns	 also	 called	 for	 additional	 actions:	 the	 introduction	 of	 ‘Newcastle‐
style’	1.00am	lockout	measures	across	the	Sydney	CBD;	more	public	transport;	public	education	
on	drinking	(including	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	running	a	competition	for	the	public	to	come	















industries.9	At	 the	 funeral	of	Daniel	Christie	on	17	 January	2014,	his	 father,	Michael,	made	an	
impassioned	plea	for	young	people	to	stop	the	violence	(Dingle	2014).	
	
Australia’s	 two	most	 senior	 political	 figures,	 Prime	 Minister	 Tony	 Abbott	 and	 the	 Governor‐	
General,	 also	 weighed	 into	 the	 debate.	 Mr	 Abbott	 stated	 he	 was	 ‘appalled’	 by	 the	 attacks	 in	
Sydney	and	said	that	there	were	essentially	two	problems:		
	














As	 Governor‐General	 and	 if	 I	 may	 say,	 as	 a	 parent	 for	 all	 parents,	 all	
grandmothers,	all	 fathers	and	grandfathers	there	can	be	no	place,	no	excuse,	no	




by	 the	multiplicity	 of	 letters	 to	 the	 Editor	 during	 the	 December/January	 2014	 period	 on	 the	
issue	 in	 both	 the	 Sydney	 Morning	 Herald	 and	 The	 Telegraph)	 –	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 was	
enormous	 pressure	 for	 the	 NSW	 Government	 and	 particularly	 the	 Premier	 to	 act.	 Just	 one	
example	 indicative	of	 the	 intensity	of	 this	 campaign	 is	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	 running	an	
editorial	comparing	Premier	O’Farrell’s	absence	in	the	debate	on	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	to	the	
cartoon	 figure	Where’s	Wally?	 (The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	 Editorial	2014).	 It	was	within	 this	
pressured	environment	that	the	Premier	announced	his	16‐point	plan	and	followed	only	a	week	
later	 with	 hastily	 and	 poorly	 drafted	 legislation	 (as	 will	 be	 discussed	 below),	 reflecting	 yet	
another	 example	 of	 a	 government	 being	drawn	 to	 a	 ‘law	 and	order’,	 simplistic	 penal	 populist	
response	 –	 but	 one	 that	 will	 ultimately	 fail	 to	 deliver	 what	 the	 public	 expect,	 including	
preventing	crime.	
	











provision	 represents	 an	 ill‐considered	 policy	 transfer	 from	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 to	 the	









statute	 books	 in	 NSW	 nor	 an	 operational	 gap:	 manslaughter	 convictions	 were	 consistently	
achieved	in	NSW	under	existing	laws.		
	
Assault	 causing	death	provisions	were	 introduced	 in	 the	Code	 jurisdictions	 to	 fill	 a	 perceived	
‘gap’	in	the	law’s	operation	in	the	context	of	one‐punch	manslaughters	(for	example,	see	Elferink	
2012).	This	is	largely	because	of	the	operation	of	the	‘accident’	defence	which	applies	in	each	of	
the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 for	 manslaughter	 (Quilter	 2014b;	 Fairall	 2012).	 The	 accident	 defence	
precludes	criminal	responsibility	for	an	event	where	it	can	be	said	to	have	occurred	by	‘accident’	
–	where	an	accident	is	determined	by	an	objective	test	being	a	result	that	was	not	intended	by	

















person,	 in	 the	 position	 of	 the	 defendant,	 have	 appreciated	 that	 the	 unlawful	 act	 exposed	 the	
victim	to	an	appreciable	risk	of	serious	 injury?	(Wilson	v	R	(1992)	174	CLR	313,	333).	 	 In	other	
words,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 and	 the	 law	 in	 NSW	 (and	 the	 other	
common	law	States)	is	that	the	objective	test	of	‘dangerousness’	requires	‘an	appreciable	risk	of	
serious	injury’	(for	instance,	from	the	punch)	but	does	not	require,	as	in	the	Code	jurisdictions,	




Furthermore,	 in	 NSW	 (and	 the	 other	 common	 law	 States),	 there	 is	 no	 defence	 of	 accident	 as	


















The	 third	 criticism	 to	 be	made	 of	 the	 Act	 is	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Government	 to	 give	 principled	
consideration	 to	 where	 assault	 causing	 death	 offences	 sit	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 fatality	 crimes.	
Indeed,	 while	 the	 Australian	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (ABS)	 has	 created	 a	 National	 Index	 Offence	




for	 assessing	 the	 need	 or	 otherwise	 for	 offence	 creation	 and	 drafting.	 That	 is,	 it	 could	 be	 an	
important	additional	dimension	to	the	scholarship	that	has	proliferated	in	the	last	decade	on	the	
legitimate	 limits	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Brown	 2013;	 Duff	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Husak	
2008;	Lacey	2009).	The	failure	to	consider	the	hierarchy	of	offence	seriousness	contributes	to	a	
lack	of	coherence	in	the	criminal	law	and	undermines	the	principles	of	‘fair	labelling’	which	play	














law	 as	part	 of	 its	 review	of	homicide	 and	manslaughter	 in	 2008,	 and	 explicitly	 addressed	 the	
question	of	hierarchy.	Consideration	of	 the	LRCI’s	analysis	 is	 illuminating	 (see	Quilter	2014b).	
The	LRCI	recommended	the	introduction	of	a	‘one	punch’	law	on	the	basis	that	deaths	caused	in	
this	 way	 often	 involved	 insufficient	 culpability	 to	 warrant	 a	 manslaughter	 conviction	 (LRCI	
2008).	That	is,	a	crime	of	assault	causing	death	does	not	represent	a	more	punitive	response	to	
one‐punch	deaths	than	manslaughter,	but	creates	a	less	serious	offence	that	reflects	the	reduced	
culpability.	 Therefore,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 or	 ladder	 of	 fatality	 crimes,	 assault	 causing	
death	logically	sits	on	the	third	tier,	below	manslaughter,	with	murder	at	the	top.	Although	this	
approach	 to	hierarchy	was	not	 articulated	 in	 the	 legislative	debates	 surrounding	 s	281	of	 the	
Criminal	Code	1913	(WA)	it	has	been	confirmed	by	the	Western	Australian	courts’	application	of	




is	 not,	 by	 definition,	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 offences,	 but	 what	 is	 necessary	 is	 to	
appropriately	encapsulate	–	 in	terms	of	 ‘label’,	penalty	and	conduct	covered	–	where	it	sits	on	
the	seriousness	hierarchy	or	 ladder.	 Its	 logical	 location	 is	on	 the	 third	 tier,	below	murder	and	
manslaughter	–	because	it	has	neither	the	subjective	fault	elements	of	murder	nor	the	objective	
fault	 elements	 of	manslaughter	 –	 and	 should	 be	 confined	 to	 the	 least	 culpable	 forms	 of	 fatal	
conduct.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 principle,	 the	 offence	 should	 be	 defined	 accordingly.	While	 the	 NSW	
offence	arguably	encapsulates	an	appropriate	level	of	culpability	in	terms	of	the	label	(‘Assault	
causing	 death’),	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 section	 of	 the	 article,	 it	 does	 not	 appropriately	


















hand,	 the	 offence	 remains	 a	 statutory	 alternative	 verdict	 to	 murder	 and	 manslaughter,	
suggesting	it	is	lower	in	the	seriousness	hierarchy	than	both	offences	(s	25A(7)).	On	the	other	
hand,	 the	 offence	 has	 the	 same	 maximum	 penalty	 as	 manslaughter	 but	 with	 the	 mandatory	





and	 6	months.	 	 The	 range	 of	 sentences	was	 3	 years	 to	 7	 years	 (and	 the	 range	 of	 non‐parole	
periods	was	1	year	5	months	to	5	years	8	months).	Sentencing	statistics	provided	to	me	by	the	
Judicial	 Commission	 of	 New	 South	Wales	 for	 the	 seven	 year	 period	 between	 April	 2006	 and	
March	 2013	 indicate	 that	 the	 median	 sentence	 for	 manslaughter	 is	 7	 years	 with	 sentences	
ranging	from	36	months	to	more	than	20	years.	While	it	is	difficult	to	draw	any	conclusions	from	
















s	 25A(2)	 offence,	 presumably	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 8‐year	 mandatory	 minimum	 could	 not	 be	
interpreted	as	a	head	sentence	(Smith	2014).	However,	when	this	NPP	period	is	read	alongside	s	
44(1)	and	 (2)	of	 the	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	 (NSW),	 the	head	sentence	 for	 an	
offender	 for	 a	 s	 25A(2)	 offence	 will	 need	 to	 be	 one‐third	 more	 than	 the	 8‐year	 mandatory	













the	 above‐average	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 for	manslaughter	 sentences.	 This	 is	 both	 inconsistent	
with	s	25A’s	 location	on	the	third	tier	 in	the	hierarchy	of	 fatality	crimes	(beneath	murder	and	
manslaughter)	 and	 out	 of	 line	 with	 previous	 sentencing	 practice,	 particularly	 for	 one‐punch	
fatality	 cases.	 It	 does,	 however,	 accord	 with	 the	 Government’s	 stated	 objective	 of	 punishing	
severely	 violent	 offences	 committed	 in	 circumstances	 where	 the	 offender	 is	 intoxicated.	 As	
Premier	O’Farrell	made	clear	in	the	second	reading	speech:	
	




It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 how	 the	 mandatory	 minimum	 for	 s	 25A(2)	 offences	 may	 impact	 on	





While	 s	25A(2)	may	be	out	of	 line	with	 the	culpability	hierarchy	and	sentencing	practices	 for	
manslaughter,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 out	 of	 line	 with	 Parliament’s	 provision	 of	 standard	 non‐parole	
periods	(SNPP)	(Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	54A(2)).	The	SNPP	represents	
the	 non‐parole	 period	 for	 an	 offence	 ‘in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 range	 of	 seriousness’	 ‘taking	 into	
account	 only	 the	 objective	 factors	 affecting	 the	 relative	 seriousness	 of	 that	 offence’	 (Crimes	
(Sentencing	 Procedure)	 Act	 1999	 s	 54A(2)).	 While	 Parliament	 has	 not	 provided	 a	 SNPP	 for	
manslaughter,	it	has	for	other	relevant	crimes	in	the	culpability	hierarchy.	For	example,	murder	
has	a	SNPP	of	25	years	for	special	classes	of	victims	(including	emergency	service	workers	and	
children	 under	 18	 years)	 and	 20	 years	 in	 all	 other	 cases;	 s	 33	 of	 the	Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW)	





matters	permitted	 to	be	 taken	 into	account,	 arguably	 the	 SNPP	assigned	 to	offences	positions	
them	in	the	culpability	hierarchy,	with	the	SNPP	for	each	of	the	assaults	(ss	33	and	35)	ranging	
from	4	to	7	years.	While	 the	two	concepts	(SNPP	and	mandatory	minimum)	are	not	 the	same,	
the	mandatory	minimum	NPP	 for	 s	 25A(2)	 offences	 places	 the	 aggravated	 offence	 above	 the	







‘intoxicated	 in	 public’	 (discussed	 in	 the	 final	 section	 of	 the	 article),	 none	 of	 which	 have	
mandatory	minimums.	These	five	new	offences	are	indicated	in	Table	1.	Table	1	also	sets	out	the	
Government’s	 planned	 likely	 increase	 in	 maximum	 penalties	 for	 the	 aggravated	 versions	 of	
those	offences	relative	 to	 the	maximum	penalty	 for	 the	 ‘basic	offence’;	 the	mooted	mandatory	
minimum	for	the	aggravated	offence;	and	the	current	SNPP	for	each	of	the	‘basic	offences’	(that	
is,	the	current	SNPP	for	the	basic	offence);	and	the	new	offences	(see	the	Bill;	O’Farrell	2014c).	
What	 Table	 1	 suggests	 is	 that	 little	 consideration	 has	 been	 given	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 seriousness	
hierarchy	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	mandatory	minimums	 and	 the	 SNPPs	 for	 the	 basic	
offence.	As	Table	1	 indicates,	 in	most	 circumstances	 the	mooted	mandatory	minimum	 for	 the	






(3)	 offences.	While	 the	 aggravated	 version	 of	 a	 s	 60(3A)	 offence	 (to	 become	 s	 60(3C))	 has	 a	





































Murder,	ss	18,	19A	 Life	 ‐	 ‐	
20	(all	other	
cases)	
Manslaughter,	ss	18,	24	 25 ‐ ‐ ‐	
Aggravated	assault	causing	death,	
s	25A(2)	 25	 ‐	 8	
	
‐	
































intoxicated	s	93C(1A)	 10	 *12	 ‐	
	
Reckless	wounding,	s	35(4)	and	































While	an	offence	entitled	 ‘Assault	causing	death’	could	 carve	out	a	 legitimate	space	 for	a	 third	








The	 peculiar	 way	 in	 which	 s	 25A	 has	 been	 drafted	 means	 that	 the	 offence	 created	 fails	 the	
principles	 of	 fair	 labelling	 and	 creates	 a	 further	 lack	 of	 coherence	 in	 the	 criminal	 law.	 These	
issues	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	 basic	 offence	 which	 has	 defined	 the	 conduct	 in	 ways	 that	 are	
arbitrary	and	lack	clarity.	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	final	section	of	the	article,	the	aggravated	
version	 has	 also	 been	 drafted	 without	 sufficient	 precision	 as	 to	 the	 aggravating	 factor	 of	










3. that	 the	 assault	 causes	 the	 death	 of	 the	 other	 person,	 where	 ‘causes’	 is	 defined	 in	 s	
25A(3).	
	
The	 focus	of	this	discussion	will	be	 in	relation	to	element	one.	 It	 is	noted,	however,	 that	while	
element	 two	 does	 not	 present	 legal	 issues,	 element	 three	may	 have	 unintentionally	 confined	














states	 ‘[f]or	 the	purposes	of	 this	section’	may	suggest	a	 legislative	 intention	 to	define	causation	
for	 this	 section	 and	 so	 oust	 the	 common	 law	 rule,	 effectively	 removing	 such	 deaths	 from	 the	
operation	 of	 this	 offence.	 This	 problem	 does	 not	 arise	 in	 the	 Western	 Australian	 equivalent	
which	states	‘dies	as	a	direct	or	indirect	result	of	the	assault’	(s	281(1));	it	is	not	clear	why	this	







In	 the	 lead	 up	 to	 announcing	 the	 assault	 causing	 death	 offence	 (discussed	 above),	 the	 NSW	
Government	 indicated	 it	 would	 be	 modelled	 on	 the	 Western	 Australian	 equivalent	 (that	 is,	
Criminal	Code	1913	 s	 281).	 The	NSW	 offence,	 however,	 departs	 in	 significant	ways	 from	 that	
model	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 ‘cause	 the	 death’	 is	 defined	 and,	 as	will	 be	 discussed	 below,	 the	
types	of	conduct	that	may	constitute	an	‘assault’	for	the	offence.	Indeed,	it	would	appear	that	the	
circumstances	of	Mr	Kelly’s	tragic	death	in	all	their	particularity	–	a	blow	to	the	head	which	led	
him	 to	 fall	 to	 the	ground	and	hit	his	head	on	 the	 footpath	and	 suffer	massive	brain	 injuries	–	
have	exerted	a	greater	 influence	on	 the	wording	of	s	25A	 than	the	Western	Australian	 law	on	
which	it	was	ostensibly	modelled.	Perhaps	there	was	a	desire	to	accurately	capture	and	embed	
in	 legislation	 the	precise	wrong	done	 to	Mr	Kelly,	 as	a	symbolic	gesture	of	 recognition	of	 that	
specific	 tragedy.	While	explicable	 in	 those	 terms,	 it	 is	not	a	 sound	basis	 for	a	major	change	 to	
NSW	 homicide	 law.	 The	 chief	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 idiosyncratic	 definition	 of	 assault	 causing	





Under	 the	 Western	 Australian	 provision	 any	 form	 of	 unlawful	 assault	 that	 either	 directly	 or	
indirectly	 causes	 the	 person’s	 death	 satisfies	 the	 offence.	 The	 NSW	 provision	 confines	 the	
‘assault’	element	to	‘intentionally	hitting	the	other	person	with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body	or	

















The	 second	 reading	 speech	 may	 be	 used	 to	 confirm	 this	 meaning	 (Interpretation	 Act	 1987	 s	
34(2)(f))	and	that	speech	indicates	that	the	Act	was	modelled	on	the	‘one	punch’	scenario:		
	
The	 Crimes	 and	 Other	 Legislation	 Amendment	 (Assault	 and	 Intoxication)	 Bill	
2014	introduces	a	new	offence	for	one‐punch	assaults	[emphasis	added]	where	a	
person	unlawfully	assaults	another	who	dies	as	a	result	of	the	assault,	with	a	20‐
year	 maximum	 sentence	 being	 introduced.	 Perpetrators	 of	 one‐punch	 killings	
[emphasis	 added]	 have	 previously	 been	 prosecuted	 in	 New	 South	 Wales	 for	
manslaughter.	This	means	that	when	the	case	goes	to	court	the	prosecution	has	to	
prove	beyond	reasonable	doubt	 that	 the	offender	 should	have	 foreseen	 that,	by	
doing	what	 he	 or	 she	 did,	 the	 victim	would	 be	 placed	 at	 risk	 of	 serious	 injury.	
(O’Farrell	2014b:	3)	
	
This	would	 suggest	 a	 fairly	 narrow	 focus	 but	 confirms	 the	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 ‘hitting’	 as	 a	














that	 offence.20	 Table	 2	 shows	 the	 most	 common	 ‘categories’	 of	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	
manslaughter	were	assault	 (40.6	per	cent	or,	 together	with	one‐punch	assaults,	48.5	per	cent,	
including	both	general	and	domestic	assaults),	followed	by	stabbings	(which	comprise	30.6	per	




































At	 law	a	shooting	(Ryan	v	R	 (1967)	121	CLR	205)	and	a	stabbing	amount	 to	assaults	 (in	their	
aggravated	 forms);	 however,	 typically	 they	 are	 categorised	 separately	 as	 (more	 serious)	








may	 depend	 on	 the	way	 the	 knife	 or	 other	 object	was	 used.	 For	 instance,	was	 it	 applied	 in	 a	
stabbing	action	more	akin	to	a	hitting	or	was	it	 ‘pushed’	or	 forced?	The	former	(a	shooting)	 is	
unlikely	to	constitute	a	hitting	because	the	hit	that	causes	the	death	comes	from	the	bullet,	not	
by	 an	 object	 held	 by	 the	 person.	 This	 means	 that	 perhaps	 appropriately	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
seriousness	hierarchy	and	the	principles	of	 fair	 labelling,	stabbings	and	shootings	(being	more	
than	40	per	cent	of	 the	more	serious	cases	currently	prosecuted	as	manslaughter	by	unlawful	









are	 included),	 the	 case	 law	 suggests	 a	 variety	 of	 behaviours	 constitute	 such	 assaults.	 The	
following	words	are	applied	in	the	cases	to	describe	how	the	assault	occurred:	brawl	(Annakin	
(1988)	37	A	Crim	R	131);	group	assault	 (Avakian	 [2003]	NSWSC	1042);	assault	 (Kwon	 [2004]	
NSWCCA	 456;	 Esposito	 [2006]	 NSWSC	 1454);	 stomping	 	 (Willoughby	 [2001]	 NSWSC	 1015);	
bashing	 (TJP	 [1999]	 NSWCCA	 408);	 striking	 (Hyatt	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 774;	 Grenenger	 [1999]	
NSWSC	380);	beating	(Sotheren	[2001]	NSWSC	214);	ramming	(Woodland	[2001]	NSWSC	416);	
hitting	 (with	 an	object)	 (Benbow	 [2009]	NSWSC	1472;	Leung	 [2013]	NSWSC	259);	one‐punch	
(eg	 R	 v	 Risteski	 [1999]	 NSWSC	 1248);	 kicking	 (Bellamy	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 1217;	 CW	 [2011]	
NSWCCA	45;	DGP	[2010]	NSWSC	1408);	head‐butt	(R	v	CK,	TS	[2007]	NSWSC	1424;	R	v	Carroll	
(2008)	 188	 A	 Crim	 R	 253);	 gouging	 (Tillman	 [2004]	 NSWSC	 794);	 tackling	 (Dean‐Wilcocks	
[2012]	 NSWSC	 107);	 strangling	 (Graham	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 1033);	 suffocated	 (Masson	 [2001]	
NSWSC	 1037);	 asphyxiation	 (Adamson	 (2002)	 132	 A	 Crim	R	 511);	 pushing	 (Wheatley	 [2007]	





















The	 introduction	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 ‘hitting’	 and	 ‘held	 by	 the	 person’	may	 have	 been	done	 to	
demarcate	certain	forms	of	conduct	(such	as	shootings	and	stabbings)	as	more	serious	than	the	
ambit	 of	 s	 25A	 offences	 –	 and	 hence	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 by	 way	 of	 murder	 or	 manslaughter.	
However,	it	does	not	explain	why	very	serious	brawls,	bashings	and	group	assaults	may	well	be	






to	be	prosecuted	as	 either	manslaughter	or	murder,	no	matter	 the	 scale	of	 seriousness	of	 the	
conduct.		
	
These	 aspects	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 s	 25A	 exemplify	 the	 vice	 of	 what	 Horder	 (1994)	 called	
‘particularism’:	 the	 inclusion	of	definitional	detail	 that	merely	exemplifies	rather	than	delimits	
wrongdoing.	The	problem	with	this	approach	is	that:	 ‘[v]ery	precise	specification	of	the	modes	
of	 responsibility	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 unmeritorious	 technical	 argument’	 over	 which	















First,	 by	 confining	 assaults	 to	 ‘hittings’	 the	 NSW	 offence	 excludes	 the	 common	 law	 form	 of	
‘assault’	 from	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 actus	 reus.	 In	 NSW	 the	 common	 law	 contained	 two	 separate	
offences	being	assault	(the	threat	of	unlawful	physical	contact)	and	battery	(the	actual	infliction	
of	 unlawful	 physical	 contact).	 These	 are	 now	 combined	 in	 the	 Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW)	 in	 the	
offence	of	‘common	assault’	in	s	61.	The	offence	in	s	25A	is	restricted	to	‘assaults’	based	on	the	
old	form	of	‘battery’	because	there	must	be	an	assault	by	hitting	the	other	person	either	with	a	
part	 of	 the	 body	 or	 an	 object	 held	 by	 the	 person.	 This	 means	 that	 ‘assaults’	 which	 involve	
creating	the	apprehension	of	imminent	unlawful	physical	contact	which	lead	to	a	person’s	death	
are	excluded	from	the	operation	of	s	25A.	For	example,	the	conduct	in	R	v	Kerr	[2004]	NSWSC	75	
(Kirby	 J,	24	February	2004)	could	not	be	prosecuted	under	s	25A.	 In	 that	matter	 the	offender	






life	 threatening	 violence	 from	 Royall,	 and	 so	 she	 jumped	 out	 of	 the	 window	 to	 escape	 and	
thereby	 died	 (Royall	 (1991)	 172	 CLR	 378).	 Such	 ‘psychic’	 assaults	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	







queue	to	get	 into	a	nightclub	or	at	a	crowded	bar)	 from	the	ambit	of	 the	offence.	This	has	 the	
implication	of	ruling	out	assaults	that	occur	recklessly.	Thus,	the	mens	rea	for	an	assault	is	either	






swinging).	 Such	 assaults	 are,	 in	 theory,	 not	 precluded	 from	 the	 more	 serious	 offence	 of	
manslaughter	by	unlawful	and	dangerous	act.		
	











guilty	 to	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	manslaughter.	While	 such	 a	 situation	 is	 covered	 by	 the	
Western	 Australian	 provision	 (and	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory,	 s	 161A(1)(b)(ii)	 ‘or	 any	 other	
person’),	such	conduct	is	likely	to	be	excluded	from	the	parameters	of	s	25A	offences.	Again,	on	
one	view,	such	conduct	 is	 less	serious	than	that	concerned	with	 intentionally	hitting	the	other	
person	 and	 may	 be	 more	 appropriately	 dealt	 with	 under	 the	 basic	 offence	 with	 a	 lower	
maximum	penalty	of	20	years	rather	than	under	manslaughter.	Furthermore,	the	drafting	of	the	
offence	as	‘intentionally	hitting	the	other	person’	appears	to	have	excluded	the	general	common	




The	 fifth	 criticism	 of	 the	 legislation	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 and	 operational	 constraints	 that	
surround	the	definition	of	 ‘intoxication’.	Before	turning	to	this	issue,	there	is	a	 larger	question	
that	 is	 thrown	 into	 relief	by	 the	 addition	of	 s	25A(2)	 into	NSW	criminal	 law:	 is	a	person	who	
commits	 the	 offence	 of	 assault	 causing	 death	while	 intoxicated	more	morally	 culpable	 than	 a	
person	who	does	so	while	stone	cold	sober?	The	NSW	Government’s	position	 is	unequivocally	
‘yes’.	This	normative	position	is	controversial	but	so,	I	would	argue,	is	the	‘common	sense’	view	
(which	 routinely	 features	 in	 defence	 sentencing	 submissions)	 that	 violence	 can	 be	 rendered	
explicable	because	the	offender	was	drunk,	or	that	intoxicated	violence	is	less	morally	culpable	
(see	also	Loughnan	2012).	Indeed,	there	is	an	important	debate	to	be	had	about	whether	or	not	
‘intoxication’	 is	an	appropriate	basis	 for	distinguishing	between	more	serious	and	 less	serious	
forms	of	criminal	conduct	in	the	context	of	offences	of	violence.		
	
It	 is	 worth	 recognising	 that	 intoxication	 already	 renders	 conduct	 more	 culpable	 in	 some	
contexts,	 including	driving	 offences.	Moreover,	 this	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 has	 strong	 support	 in	
tohe	wider	community.	For	instance,	a	distinction	applies	in	the	driving	context	with	the	offence	
of	dangerous	driving	occasioning	death	(s	52A)	and	 its	aggravated	 form	(s	52A(2))	one	of	 the	






The	 principled	 basis	 for	 introducing	 random	 breath‐testing	 and	 other	 drink‐driving	 related	
offences	 such	 as	 aggravated	 dangerous	 driving	 is	 found	 in	 studies	 that	 demonstrate	 the	
relationship	between	drinking	and	impaired	(risky)	driving.23	Yet	studies	have	also	repeatedly	
demonstrated	the	link	between	alcohol,	violence	and	a	myriad	of	societal	harms	(including	that	
alcohol	 increases	 risks).24	 The	 analogy	may	 be	 imperfect,	 but	 if	 we	 see	 one‐punch	 deaths	 as	
somewhat	 analogous	 to	 drink‐driving	 fatalities,	 perhaps	 there	 is	 a	 question	 as	 to	 whether	
intoxication	should	be	seen	as	an	aggravating	factor	for	certain	other	forms	of	violent	conduct.25		
	
Putting	 to	 one	 side	 the	 legitimacy	 or	 otherwise	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 basic	 and	 aggravated	
offences	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 intoxication,	 there	 are	 clear	 legal	 problems	 with	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	














of	 alcohol,	 drug	 or	 other	 substance	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 alleged	 offence	may	be	 given	 as	
determined	by	an	analysis	carried	out	under	the	new	Div	4,	Pt	10,	LEPRA	(s	25A(6)(a));	
and	
 	‘the	 accused	 is	 conclusively	 presumed	 to	 be	 intoxicated	by	 alcohol’	 if	 the	 prosecution	






The	 bill	 sets	 out	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 prosecution	 can	 prove	 intoxication.	 An	
accused	 person	 is	 presumed	 intoxicated	 if	 they	 have	more	 than	 0.15	 grams	 or	
more	of	alcohol	in	220	litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood.	Where	this	is	not	
available,	 or	 where	 drugs	 are	 suspected,	 other	 evidence	 may	 be	 considered,	
including	the	concentration	of	alcohol	or	drug	in	a	person’s	breath	or	blood	at	the	
time	of	 the	offence	and	evidence	 from	closed‐circuit	 television	 [CCTV]	 footage,	eye	




under	s	25A(2)	 is	 likely	to	be	proving	that,	at	 the	time	the	offence	was	committed,	 the	person	
was	in	fact	intoxicated.	Aside	from	situations	where	a	person	is	‘deemed’	to	be	intoxicated	by	the	
prosecution	 proving,	 via	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 under	Div	 4,	 Pt	 10	 of	 LEPRA,	 that	 there	was	
present	in	the	accused’s	breath	or	blood	a	concentration	of	0.15	grams	or	more	of	alcohol	in	220	
litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood	(such	cases	are	 likely	to	be	rare,	 for	 the	operational	
reasons	discussed	below),	the	legislation	leaves	a	significant	‘grey	area’	as	to	what	is	meant	by	










This	 problem	 does	 not	 arise	 in	 other	 situations	 where	 intoxication	 is	 an	 aggravating	 factor.	
Thus,	 for	 the	 aggravated	 offence	 of	 dangerous	 driving	 occasioning	 death	 in	 s	 52A,	where	 the	




















The	Bill	 introducing	 this	definition	was	read	 for	a	second	 time	on	26	February	2014	and	was	
passed	 by	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 on	 6	 March	 2014	 without	 amendment.	 If	 passed	 by	 the	
Legislative	Council	 it	will	 apply	 to	 the	 new	assault	 causing	 death	 offence	because	 s	 25A(2)	 is	
defined	 to	be	an	 ‘aggravated	 intoxication	offence’	 in	 s	8A(1)	of	 the	Bill.	 Sub‐section	 (a)	 of	 the	
definition	above	transplants	 the	definition	of	 ‘intoxicated’	 from	provisions	 found	 in	other	Acts	
which	typically	relate	to	a	situation	where	a	police	officer	is	required	to	exercise	a	discretion	as	
to	 whether	 a	 person	 is	 intoxicated	 before	 exercising	 other	 powers	 or	 charging	 an	 offence.	
Section	 9(6)	 of	 the	 Summary	 Offences	 Act	 1988	 (NSW)	 (the	 definition	 of	 intoxication	 for	 the	















mooted	definition	 to	be	applied	 to	 the	s	25A(2)	offence	and	replaced	with	 ‘as	 the	result	of	 the	
consumption	or	taking	of	alcohol	or	a	narcotic	drug	…’.	Such	a	definition	of	 intoxication	will	be	
legally	 and	 operationally	 unworkable	 given	 it	 will	 be	 near	 impossible	 to	 prove	 that	 the	
behaviour	 (that	 is,	 the	 ‘person’s	 speech,	 balance,	 co‐ordination	 or	 behaviour’)	 is	 ‘noticeably	
affected	as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 consumption	 or	 taking	 of’	 alcohol	 or	 drugs.	 In	 other	words,	 how	
could	the	Crown	prove	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	‘behaviour’	identified	was	 ‘the	result	











other	 place	 at	 which	 the	 person	 is	 detained	 in	 connection	with	 the	 offence’	 (s	 138F(1)).	 For	
blood	and	urine	samples	for	alcohol	or	drugs	it	must	be	within	four	hours	after	the	commission	
of	 the	 offence	 (s	 138G(3))	 and	 a	 person	may	 be	 taken	 to	 and	 detained	 at	 a	 hospital	 for	 the	
purpose	of	 the	 taking	of	a	blood	or	urine	sample’	 (s	138G(4)).27	Not	only	will	 it	be	difficult	 in	
some	 situations	 to	 define	 exactly	 when	 the	 offence	 was	 committed28	 and	 hence	 when	 time	












to	 the	 ‘presumptive	conclusion’	of	a	0.15	 test,	and	so	would	have	had	 to	build	evidence	of	Mr	
Loveridge’s	 intoxication.	Evidence	that	he	had	consumed	alcohol	would	not	be	enough.	 In	that	
case,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 evidence	 of	 Mr	 Loveridge’s	 intoxication	 that	 was	 available	 at	 his	
sentencing	hearing	was	only	available	because	it	had	been	volunteered	by	him	and	formed	part	
of	 an	 agreed	 statement	 of	 facts.30	 Such	 practices	 are	 unlikely	 to	 continue	 with	 a	 mandatory	
minimum	 of	 eight	 years	 being	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 conviction.	 By	 contrast,	 it	 may	 have	 been	














25A(2)	 (giving	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 ‘tough’	 response	 that	 satisfies	 what	 are	 said	 to	 be	 the	







plea	 (in	accordance	with	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	 (NSW)	ss	21A(3)(k),	22	and	
Thomson	and	Houlton	(2000)	49	NSWLR	389).	Furthermore,	 in	10	of	the	matters,	the	offender	
was	 originally	 charged	 with	 murder	 but	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 the	 less	 serious	 offence	 of	
manslaughter.	 An	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 basic	 offence	 and	 an	
aggravated	version	(similar	to	the	hierarchy	between	murder	and	manslaughter)	may	mean	that	






(Assault	 and	 Intoxication)	 Act	 2014	 (NSW).	 Although	 the	 NSW	 Government	 claims	 to	 have	
‘listened’	 to	 community	 concerns	 and	 acted	 decisively,	 the	 unfortunate	 irony	 is	 that	 the	
operational	difficulties	 to	which	the	 legislation	will	give	rise	are	 likely	to	result	 in	widespread	
disappointment.	The	 appearance	 of	 a	 tough	 and	 effective	 response	 to	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence	
may	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 illusory.	 It	 has	 been	 more	 than	 60	 years	 since	 the	 NSW	 Parliament	
substantially	 amended	 homicide	 offences	 in	 the	 Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW).	 The	 addition	 of	 two	
new	 forms	 of	 homicide	 in	 NSW	 –	 assault	 causing	 death,	 and	 assault	 causing	 death	 while	
intoxicated	–	should	not	have	occurred	in	the	context	of	a	volatile	knee‐jerk	reaction	to	genuine	
community	 anxiety	 about	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence,	 and	 with	 such	 haste	 that	 there	 was	 no	







Law	 Reform	 Commission,	 and	 the	 NSW	 Parliament’s	 Legislation	 Review	 Committee.	
Unfortunately,	these	problems	will	now	fall	to	be	resolved	in	the	context	of	operational	policing,	
prosecutorial	 discretion	 and	 the	 conduct	 of	 trials.	 These	 environments	 are	 not	 necessarily	
conducive	to	yielding	sound	interpretations	of	general	application	and	leave	no	opportunity	for	
the	emergence	of	a	considered	opinion	that	further	criminalisation	or	draconian	penalties	may	
not	 in	 fact	 be	 the	best	 regulatory	 tool	 for	 addressing	 the	problem	of	 alcohol‐related	violence.	
The	other	problem	is	that	the	government	has	set	high	expectations	for	how	one‐punch	deaths	








1	 The	 author	 thanks	 the	 participants	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Law	Workshop	 (held	 at	 Sydney	University,	 14‐15	
February	2014)	for	their	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	paper.	The	author	also	thanks	Luke	McNamara	
for	his	thoughtful	comments	on	a	draft	of	this	paper.	




reckless	wounding;	 reckless	wounding	 in	 company;	 reckless	 grievous	 bodily	 harm;	 reckless	 grievous	
bodily	harm	in	company;	affray;	and	sexual	assault	(see	Roth	2014:	6).	
4	 The	 Liquor	 Amendment	 Act	 2014	 introduced:	 lockouts	 from	 1.30am;	 cessation	 of	 liquor	 service	 at	
3:00pm;	 imposition	 of	 similar	 licensing	 conditions	 as	 those	 already	 applied	 in	 Kings	 Cross	 to	 the	




5	 The	 Crimes	 Amendment	 (Intoxication)	 Bill	 2014	 was	 read	 by	 the	 Premier	 for	 a	 second	 time	 on	 26	















are	 thrown	 out	 of	 one	 venue	 are	 not	 admitted	 to	 another;	 change	 of	 bail	 and	 good	 behaviour	 bonds	
revoking	 the	 rights	 of	 a	 person	 who	 commits	 an	 alcohol‐related	 crime	 to	 drink	 outside	 their	 home;	


















12An	 aggregate	 sentence	 is	 where	 a	 court	 is	 ‘sentencing	 an	 offender	 for	 more	 than	 one	 offence’	 and	
imposes	an	aggregate	sentence	of	imprisonment	with	respect	to	all	or	any	2	or	more	of	those	offences	
instead	of	 imposing	a	 separate	 sentence	of	 imprisonment	 for	each:	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	
1999	(NSW)	s	53A.	
13The	six	offences	are	reckless	GBH	in	company	(s	35(1));	reckless	GBH	(s	35(2));	reckless	wounding	in	
company	 (s	 35(3));	 reckless	 wounding	 (s	 35(4));	 assault	 police	 officer	 –	 reckless	 GBH	 or	 wounding	
(public	 disorder)	 (s	 60(3A));	 assault	 police	 officer	 –	 reckless	 GBH	 or	 wounding	 (not	 during	 public	
disorder)	(s	60(3))	(O’Farrell	2014c).	
14This	mandatory	minimum	is	not	new	but	was	introduced	in	2011.	






offenders	 assaulted	 a	 taxi	 driver	with	moderate	 force	but	 the	 victim	 suffered	 from	heart	 disease	 and	
died	 from	 a	 heart	 attack.	 A	 manslaughter	 trial	 in	 NSW	 that	 recently	 returned	 a	 not	 guilty	 verdict	
involved	a	situation	that	would	potentially	be	excluded.	 In	this	matter	Chab	Taleb	(a	 former	bouncer)	
was	involved	in	a	brawl	with	Jason	Daep	at	the	Pontoon	nightclub	in	Cockle	Bay	and	pushed	Daep	into	












(a)	except	 for	 the	purposes	of	section	93C,	 it	 includes	violent	conduct	 towards	property	as	well	as	
violent	conduct	towards	persons,	and	






















23For	 example,	Homel	1997;	Road	Traffic	Accidents	 in	NSW	2001,	 Statistical	 Statement:	 Year	 ended	31	
December	2001	(RTA	Road	Safety	Strategy	Branch,	January	2003)	reveals	the	high	costs	of	drink‐driving	
not	only	in	terms	of	death	or	injury	to	drivers	and	other	users	of	the	roads,	but	also	in	terms	of	economic	
cost	 involving	 loss	 of	 earnings,	 decreased	 enjoyment	 of	 life,	 medical	 and	 hospital	 expenses,	 costs	
associated	with	damage	or	 loss	of	personal	property,	 and	 the	public	expenditure	on	 the	 investigation	
and	 prosecution	 of	 offenders.	 See	 also	 RTA,	 Drink	 Driving:	 Problem	 Definition	 and	 Countermeasure	
Summary	(August	2000)	at	2.	







vehicle	 being	 involved	 in	 an	 accident.	 A	 blood	 alcohol	 reading	within	 the	 “high	 range”	 increases	 the	




General	 Concerning	 the	Offence	 of	High	 Range	 Prescribed	 Content	 of	 Alcohol	 Section	 9(4)	 of	 the	 Road	
Transport	 (Safety	 and	 Traffic	Management)	 Act	 1999	 (No	 3	 of	 2002)	 (2004)	 61	 NSWLR	 305	 at	 [10].	
Another	aspect	is	that	s	52A	offences	are	ones	of	strict	liability	whereas	s	25A	offences	(together	with	
the	nine	other	offences	that	are	to	be	introduced	in	late	February	2014)	are	mens	rea	offences.	
26While	not	the	subject	of	 this	article,	 it	 is	 troubling	that	the	 focus	of	 the	definition	in	the	Bill	 is	 ‘public’	
















30This	 is	 a	 common	practice	 in	 one‐punch	manslaughter	 cases	with	 17	 of	 the	 18	 such	matters	 in	NSW		
from	 1998‐2013	 involving	 guilty	 pleas	 and,	 on	 sentence,	 an	 agreed	 statement	 of	 facts	 including	 in	
relation	to	the	offender’s	 level	of	 intoxication.	 Indeed,	of	 the	one‐punch	manslaughter	cases,	only	 four	
did	not	involve	either	alcohol	or	drugs	and	in	all	cases	evidence	of	intoxication	or	drugs	came	from	the	
agreed	statement	of	facts:	see	Quilter	2014b.	
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